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We evaluate the effect on test scores of a UK education reform which has increased
funding of schools and encouraged their specialisation in particular subject areas, en-
hancing pupil choice and competition between schools. Using several data sets, we
apply cross-sectional and difference-in-differences matching models, to confront issues
of the choice of an appropriate control group and different forms of selection bias. We
demonstrate a statistically significant causal effect of the specialist schools policy on
test score outcomes. The duration of specialisation matters, and we consistently find
that the longer a school has been specialist the larger is the impact on test scores. We
finally disentangle the funding effect from a specialisation effect, and the latter occurs
yielding relatively large improvements in test scores in particular subjects.
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1 Introduction
In many countries around the world, such as the US and the UK, there has been widespread
debate about the best way to improve the educational performance of school pupils. A com-
mon theme in terms of policy is a shift away from centralised funding and provision to a
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decentralised approach to educational provision (Hoxby, 1996). In the US the ‘No Child Left
Behind Act’, introduced by the Bush administration, coupled school choice with account-
ability measures, to allow parents of children in under-performing schools the opportunity to
choose higher performing schools. However, there is debate about whether this policy has had
a positive effect on the educational performance of pupils, in fact some claim that it has been
harmful to America’s schools (The Economist, 2009). As a result, the Obama government is
considering spending an extra $10 billion on education in an attempt to turn around failing
schools, so bringing the issue of whether increased school resources will improve educational
outcomes back on to the political agenda.
In the UK a number of educational policy reforms have been introduced, such as the 1988
Education Reform Act, which led to the creation of a quasi market in education, at the heart
of which is enhanced parental choice and competition between schools for pupils. However,
funding for secondary schools has also been increased substantially since 1997, rising from
£9.9bn to £15.8bn in 2006/7. Over the same period real expenditure per pupil increased by
over 50%, from £3206 to £4836 (in 2005/6 prices). One of the key policy initiatives that has
led, in part, to this increase in funding is the specialist schools policy, which was introduced in
1994. To obtain specialist status, state maintained schools are required to raise unconditional
sponsorship from the private sector of £50,000 and to have a development plan. Selected
schools then received a capital grant of £100,000 from central government, and around £130
per pupil over a four year period.1 This amounts to an approximate increase in funding per
pupil of 5%.
In addition to increasing the funding of schools, the specialist schools policy also simul-
taneously enhanced parental choice of school, and competition between schools for pupils,
because schools were encouraged to specialise in particular subjects.2 The earliest specialist
schools were Technology schools, starting in 1994, now constituting approximately 20% of all
schools, with significant proportions of schools focusing on Arts, Sport and Science. Other
specialisms, such as Business and Maths were introduced more recently in 2002.3 Specialist
schools are encouraged to spread good practice to non-specialist schools in the same educa-
tional district with respect, for instance, to teaching methods. Over 80% of secondary schools
are now specialist, and the intention is that all schools will eventually become specialist.
The key objective of the specialist schools policy is to improve the test score performance
of secondary school pupils. Evaluating whether this policy has had the desired effect provides
important guidance for policy makers contemplating whether, and how, to spend increas-
ingly scarce resources on schooling. However, there are very few studies which focus on the
1The capital grant has been reduced to £25,000 in recent years but was much higher for the time period
covered by this study.
2It is worth noting that although specialist schools are encouraged to focus on particular subjects, all
schools are also required to deliver a national curriculum. Thus, most pupils will typically study around
10 subjects in their final two years of compulsory schooling between the ages of 14 and 16. They then sit
national recognised tests, the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), in each subject.
The GCSE is a norm-based examination taken by almost all pupils, and the grades range from A* to G.
Grades A* to C are considered acceptable for entry to university, together with the acquisition of advanced
qualifications obtained two years later. Pupils of lower ability may also take General National Vocational
Qualifications instead of GCSEs.
3See the Department for Children, Schools and Families website for more details:
www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/specialistschools.
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evaluation of the specialist school policy, and the evidence from this literature is mixed.
Gorard (2002), Jesson and Crossley (2004) and OFSTED (2005) find a positive effect on
test scores. Schagen and Goldstein (2002) raise some issues regarding the methodological
approach of this work, which uses school-level data, arguing that pupil level data and multi-
level modelling techniques should be used. Taylor (2007) finds that the specialist schools
policy has had very little impact on average test scores, though there is evidence of more
substantial impacts for specific areas of specialisation, for example, business and technology.
Bradley and Taylor (2008) estimate the impact of the specialist schools policy, as well as
other educational policies, using school-level panel data, and find a small positive effect of
specialist schools on test scores. However, many of these papers fail to allow for the bias
that often arises in programme evaluation settings, which calls into question whether they
have been able to identify a causal effect of the specialist schools policy. Furthermore, many
of these studies do not explicitly consider the mechanisms by which the specialist schools
policy could affect the test score outcomes of pupils.
Our contributions in this paper are twofold. This is the first paper that we are aware
of to evaluate the impact of the specialist school policy on a variety of test score outcomes,
including test score gain, combining matching methods at the pupil and school levels with
a difference-in-differences analysis.4 This approach enables us to deal with various forms of
selection bias that we identify below, as well as the effect of unobserved pupil and school
heterogeneity. The second contribution of this paper is that we provide an exploratory
analysis of the relative importance of two different mechanisms by which the policy could
affect test scores - funding and specialisation effects. The increase in resources to specialist
schools creates a funding effect whereby increased spending on books and equipment, for
instance, improves the quality of the educational experience throughout the school and
hence may improve test scores in all subjects. By allowing greater subject specialisation,
parents can select those schools that ‘match’ the aptitudes and skills of their children, thereby
increasing allocative efficiency. ‘Better’ subject specialist teachers may also move to schools
that specialise in their subject area. Hence test scores in particular subjects may increase -
a specialisation effect.
There are likely to be several sources of bias in an evaluation of the specialist schools
policy, arising primarily from selection on unobservables (so-called ‘hidden bias’), that must
be mitigated. First, there is the non-random selection of schools into the programme (here-
after school selection bias). Figure 1 shows the variation in the number of schools becoming
specialist between 1994-2006. The Figure also shows that there is an output trend in GCSE
test scores and it is clear that specialist schools have out-performed non-specialist schools
throughout the period.5 Moreover, some schools were early adopters whereas others joined
4Previous studies using matching methods are mainly focused on the estimated effects of training pro-
grammes on the unemployed. For example, Blundell et al. (2004) study the effects of the New Deal for
Young People in the UK. Aakvik (2001) evaluates the Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programme by
comparing employment outcomes of participants and nonparticipants. Diprete and Gangl (2004) analyze
the impact of unemployment insurance on several outcomes such as post unemployment wage or probability
of relocation. Machin et al. (2004) adopt a similar approach to ours in evaluating the Excellence in Cities
programme.
55+ A*-C grades is an important policy measure and, when combined with suitable grades at A level,
permits entry to HE.
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the programme much later. ‘Older’ specialist schools may have had a first-mover advantage
insofar as they have more time to exploit the additional resources to generate better test
scores. Moreover, as their reputation grows, these schools attract better pupils, particularly
in their specialism, which, via a peer effect also enhances the test score performance of other
pupils in the school. This process is cumulative and self-reinforcing. There is some evidence
in Figure 2 to support this view, which reports the total number of specialist schools be-
tween 1994-2005, insofar as schools that were early adopters have higher growth rates in the
proportion of pupils with ‘good’ exam results. Figure 3 disaggregates the average test score
performance of Figure 1 into quintiles and plots the proportion of specialist schools in the
lowest (quintile 1) and highest (quintile 5) categories. For example, in 2003 the proportion
of specialist schools in the 5th quintile of average test score performance is 60%, whereas it
reduces to just 26% in the 1st quintile. What is immediately clear is that specialist schools
are increasingly likely to have test scores in the highest quintile, which is strongly suggestive
of non-random assignment of certain types of school into the specialist schools initiative.
A closely related source of bias is the non-random selection of pupils into specialist schools
(pupil selection bias), insofar as unobservably more able pupils are ‘cream-skimmed’ by ‘good’
(specialist) schools. Figure 4 provides some evidence of cream-skimming based on observable
characteristics that are correlated with test scores performance. Panel A of Figure 4 shows
that pupils from the poorest social backgrounds, as reflected by their eligibility for free
school meals, are less likely to attend specialist schools. Specifically, specialist schools are
more likely to have a higher percentage of pupils in the 1st quintile (pupils less eligible for
free school meals), than in the 5th quintile (more eligible for free school meals). In Panel B
we show the distribution of ethnic minorities, where we plot percentage differences for the
first and fifth quintiles between non-specialist and specialist schools. Specialist schools are
more likely to have a lower percentage of ethnic minority pupils.
Figures 1-4 suggest that school selection bias and pupil selection bias may be very real.
In principle, it would be helpful to disentangle these two sources of bias, however, this is
not possible with our data. In the evaluation of the specialist schools policy that follows
we therefore treat these two sources of bias as observationally equivalent and try to deal
with them in a ‘reduced-form’ cross-sectional matching approach. This could, however, be
problematic for our evaluation of the specialist schools policy because pupils and schools
will clearly differ in all kinds of unobservable characteristics. We investigate whether unob-
servables are a problem for our cross-sectional models by using two indirect tests that have
been developed in the literature and involve the inclusion of a confounder variable (Ichino
et al. 2008, Rosembaum, 1987). An alternative, and more robust, approach is to exploit the
availability of repeated cross-sectional data. Specifically two different models are estimated
- a linear difference-in-differences (DID) model, which is combined with matching at school
level following Machin et al. (2004), and a DID matching model following Heckman et al
(1997 and 1998).
Figures 1-4 also imply that there are likely to be heterogeneous policy effects on pupil
test scores depending on the length of time a school has been exposed to the policy. Machin
et al. (2004) do, in fact, find heterogeneous effects in their evaluation of the Excellence in
Cities policy. We explore the possibility of heterogeneous effects throughout our analysis.
The data used to estimate the matching models were obtained from several sources:
the National Pupil Database (NPD, cohorts 2002-2004), the Youth Cohort Surveys (YCS)
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and the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England (LSYPE), and to each of these
datasets we append school level data from the annual School Performance Tables and the
annual Schools’ Census. Using these data we discuss in Section 2 how we tackle the sources
of bias identified earlier.
Our main finding is that the specialist schools policy has had a positive and statistically
significant causal effect on the test score outcomes of secondary school pupils in England. In
the YCS cross-sectional matching model we investigate the effect on pupils test scores when
each school switches from non-specialist (‘policy-off’) to specialist (‘policy-on’) status. The
estimates suggest that the policy has raised GCSE scores by between 2-3 GCSE points. A
bigger effect is obtained at the upper (5+ GCSE grades A*-C) and high end (10+ GCSE
grades A*-C) of the test score distribution. These results imply that the policy has had larger
effects for more able students. The duration of specialisation matters and is a common thread
in our results. In the LSYPE cross-sectional estimates, the peak of the policy effect (around
3 GCSE points) is reached after approximately four years, at which point the additional
funding typically ceases. However, the policy effect does not decline to zero beyond that
point, rather it remains positive and statistically significant. This suggests that we are not
simply capturing a funding effect. These results are substantially confirmed by the DID
analysis. In particular, the linear DID model shows that pupils in schools that have been
specialist for longest have higher test scores. In the DID matching model, where we consider
the switch from a pre-treatment status of non-specialist schools to a treatment status of
schools specialised for one or two years, the impact of the policy on test score is around 0.4
GCSE points but we do not find any effect on test score gains. This finding confirms that
the length of the specialization matters, and for schools that have been in the programme
less than four years the effect of the policy on test scores is small.
Finally, models that attempt to disentangle the funding effect from a specialisation effect
suggest that there is a specialisation effect. This amounts to between 21-50% of the total
effect depending on the matching estimator used.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 we explain the econo-
metric approach, in Section 2 we discuss the data and how we select the treatment and
comparison groups. Section 4 discusses the propensity score estimates and the findings from
the cross-sectional matching models and from the difference-in-differences matching models.
Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 Data and dependent variables
We use three different datasets in our analysis, two of which are cross-sectional (the YCS
and the LSYPE) and one of which has a panel element (the NPD). Tables 1 and 2 show
various measures of test score outcome for each dataset. The first is the total GCSE score
(GCSEscore), taken at age 16, that is, the number of points achieved in all GCSE subjects,
where grades are ranked from A∗=8 points to fail=0. The second is a binary variable
indicating whether a pupil obtained 5 or more GCSE grades A*-C (GCSEbin). The third
measure is also a dummy variable indicating whether a pupil obtained 10 or more GCSE
grades A*-C (GCSEbin10 ), which refers to the upper end of the ability distribution. A
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fourth measure refers to tests taken at age 11, that is the total score in English, maths
and science in the so-called Key Stage 2 tests, taken in the final year of primary schooling.
Standardising both the GCSEscore and the Key Stage 2 score and taking the difference we
obtain test score gain, or value added, between the ages of 11 and 16.
The YCS is a major programme of longitudinal research designed to monitor the be-
haviour and decisions of representative samples of young people (around 14,000 per survey)
aged 16 and upwards. The survey records educational outcomes and provides more socio-
demographic data on the pupil and their family than in the NPD. A further advantage of
the YCS is that we observe precisely when each school switches from non-specialist (‘policy-
off’) to specialist (‘policy-on’) status to investigate how the test scores of different cohorts
of pupils change. Specifically, we link schools in YCS11 with the same schools in YCS12
and restrict attention to those pupils in a non-specialist school in 2001/02 (‘policy-off’) and
compare them with pupils in the same school which acquired specialist status during 2002/04
(‘policy-on’). This reduces the original sample to 5,244, see Table 1. This approach allows
us to go some way to controlling for school selection bias since we essentially difference out
unobserved school fixed effects. Pupil selection bias should also not be a problem since all of
the pupils in the analysis had chosen a non-specialist school, which then becomes specialist
during their period of secondary schooling (policy on). One potential drawback of this type
of analysis is the fact that we cannot distinguish year effects and cohort effects, because the
inclusion of these dummies would be perfectly collinear with the treatment variable. Conse-
quently, we assume that temporal exogenous shocks affect all schools in the same way, hence
shifting the distribution of pupil attainment.
The LSYPE is a panel study of young people started in 2004, when its sample of young
people (around 15,700) were aged 13 to 14. The study brings together data from a wide
range of sources and reflects the variety of influences on learning and pupil progression.
Annual interviews obtain information from the pupil and from parental interviews. The
main advantage of these data are that we can exploit a rich set of family covariates, such
as parental education and employment. Information on pupil behaviour is also included in
the survey, for instance, the use of PCs to support learning and the attitude towards their
school, proxied by use of a school sports facilities. The LSYPE allows us to control for the
duration of specialist school status, to investigate whether the effect, if any, of the specialist
schools policy declines over time for a specific cohort of pupils. We can track schools that
have been specialised for two, four or five or more years. The downside of the LSYPE is
that our sample is quite small, decreasing according to the year of specialisation from 3,837
to 2,933. Nevertheless, the GCSE scores are very similar for each year of specialisation (see
Table 1).
The NPD refers to the population of pupils attending maintained, state funded, schools
in England. The primary advantages of the NPD are that it refers to the population of
pupils in secondary schooling, hence providing a large number of observations, and there are
several measures of test score. Our dependent variables are constructed from national test
scores obtained by pupils at Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4 (i.e. GCSE tests). One important
advantage of the NPD is that it also includes a measure of pupil attainment prior to entry
into secondary schooling, that is, the Key Stage 2 tests taken at age 11. We consider three
versions of the NPD where pupils were in their final year of compulsory education in either
2002, 2003 or 2004. The original sample sizes are 504,555, 523,658 and 560,493 observations,
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respectively. We choose these three cohorts of the NPD because this is the period in which
many secondary schools acquired specialist school status. Also, the percentage of pupils in
specialist schools in 2002 was 30%; in 2003 it was 50%, and in 2004 it was 70%. This allows
us to select representative treatment and control groups. By pooling the three cohorts we
can observe the same school across cohorts and identify when the specialist school policy is
‘switched on’ for any particular school. Since we know when a school became specialist over
the period 1994-2006 we can also investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the policy
effects.
The NPD data is used in three separate analysis. First, to estimate a linear difference-
in-differences model of pupil test scores at Key Stage 4 (GCSEscore). We initially pool
the three cohorts. Using a school level data set we identify only those schools that became
specialist in the 1997-2003 period because this corresponds to the time the pupils from the
three NPD cohorts attended secondary school. For example, the 2002 cohort began their
secondary schooling in 1997/98, whereas the 2004 cohort began in 1999/00. Our control
group is drawn from those schools that become specialist between 2004 and 2006 on the
grounds that these schools are likely to be most similar to the current group of specialist
schools. To find more suitable treatment and control groups we estimate a propensity score
matching at school level, using only pre-policy school characteristics. We further restrict
our sample of schools to those that lie on the common support, which we then merge with
the pooled pupil-level data from the NPD. Panel A of Table 2 provides the total number
of post-matched specialist schools (1109), sub-divided by the year in which they became
specialist, as well as the number of non-specialist schools (894). Panel A, Table 2, also
reports descriptive statistics on the GCSE performance and the raw DID.
The second analysis is the estimation of a DID matching model of pupil test scores,
we consider the year 2002 as our pre-treatment period, while 2003 and 2004 are separately
used as post-treatment periods. We first pool separately the NPD cohorts 2002-2003 and
2002-2004. For the first case, 2002-2003, in the school level data we identify schools that are
non-specialist in 2002, but that will become specialist in 2005 or 2006, we exclude schools
that never become specialist. Then we identify schools that are non-specialist in 2002 but
will be specialist in 2003. We finally merge the school data to the NPD. We can identify now
four categories: in Ct′ we have pupils in 2002 that attended non-specialist schools that will
remain so in 2003. In Tt′ , we have pupils in schools that were non-specialist in 2002 but that
become specialist in 2003. In Ct we observe pupils in schools that are both non-specialist
in 2002 and 2003. In Tt, we observe pupils in schools that became specialist in 2003, but
which were non-specialist in 2002. For the second case, 2002-2004, we repeat the above steps
but 2003 is replaced by 2004. The main difference between these two analyses is that in the
first case schools have only been specialist for one year, whereas in the second case schools
have been specialist for two years. Panel B of Table 2 reports the total number of schools in
each group, as well as the raw DID for each of our analyses. Using these data we estimate a
difference-in-differences matching model on test scores at KS4 and on test score gain between
KS2 and KS4.
In a third analysis we estimate matching models at the pupil level by subject of specialism,
in an attempt to disentangle the funding effect from the specialisation effect. In this analysis
we only use the 2003 cohort because this is most ‘balanced’ in terms of the percentage of
pupils in specialist schools, that is, approximately 50% of pupils.
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3 Econometric Approach
3.1 Cross-sectional matching methods
Our approach is based on the concept of the education production function wherein test
scores are a function of personal, family and school inputs, as well as specialist school status.
However, to estimate the effect of the specialist schools policy on the test scores of pupils re-
quires a solution to the counterfactual question of how pupils would have performed had they
not attended a specialist school. We adopt the non-parametric matching method which does
not require an exclusion restriction, or a particular specification of the model for attendance
at a specialist school. Thus, the main purpose of matching is to find a group of non-treated
pupils who are similar to the treated in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics, x, the only
remaining difference being that one group attended a specialist school and another group
did not. In the first stage we therefore estimate the propensity score (PS) using a discrete
response model of attendance at a specialist school.
One assumption of the matching method is the common support or overlap condition
which ensures that pupils with the same x values have a positive probability of attending a
specialist school. A second, and key assumption is the conditional independence assumption
(CIA), which implies that selection into treatment is solely based on observable character-
istics.6 There may, however, be a problem of hidden bias due to unobserved effects, and
any positive association between a pupil’s treatment status and test score outcomes may not
therefore represent a causal effect. If the assumption of ignorability (i.e. no hidden bias)
fails, the treatment is endogenous and the matching estimates will be biased (Heckman et
al. 1998). Several tests have been developed to assess whether hidden bias is a problem
in cross-sectional models and we adopt the method proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) and
Rosenbaum (1987). The details of these tests are reported in Appendix A.
Given these two assumptions, the matching method allows us to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATT estimator is the mean difference in outcomes
over the common support, weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.









where T and C represent treatment and control groups, respectively. Wij is the weight placed
on the jth observation in constructing the counterfactual for the ith treated observation. Y1
is the outcome of participants and Y0 of non-participants; wi is the re-weighting that recon-
structs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. A number of well-known matching
estimators exist which differ in the way they construct the weights, Wij. We use two match-
ing algorithms, nearest neighbor (NN) and kernel with bandwidth 0.1. Analytical standard
errors are provided for the first estimator (Abadie and Imbens, 2008) and bootstrapped
standard errors for the second (Heckman et al. 1998).




Given the availability of the NPD data, which has a short panel element for repeated cross-
sections of pupils, we report the estimates from the two DID analyses. Recall that the first
is a linear DID estimator coupled with matching based on schools, whereas the second is a
DID matching estimator at pupil level.
Recall that to obtain the first estimator, we initially match schools using a propensity
score model which includes several pre-policy school variables. Only those schools that lie on
the common support are included in the analysis to ensure that the treatment and control
groups of schools are as like as possible. A DID model is then estimated at the pupil level,
see equation 2, which has the advantage of eliminating unobserved time-invariant differences
between treated and untreated pupils.
Yistj = αj + βtjPolicyist ∗ Y earspecj + γtXit + δjZs + λjYis,t−5 + istj (2)
Y is the test score at age 16 of pupil i in year t in school s which is specialist from year j.
Policy is an individual level dummy indicating whether the pupil is assigned to a specialist
school in year t, whereas Y earspec is a dummy indicating when a school becomes specialist
(‘policy on’) in year j in the period 1997-2002. X denotes individual characteristics, Z is
a set of lagged (pre-policy) school characteristics, and the lagged dependent variable Yis,t−5
indicates the pupil’s prior (primary school) attainment measured by the total test score at
age 11. The coefficient of interest is βtj which represents the ATT , or the difference-in-
differences estimate of the specialist schools policy. These models allow us to control for
time-invariant unobserved pupil effects and school fixed effects.
The second estimator adopted is the difference-in-differences matching estimator, which
has been implemented by Blundell et al (2004), Smith and Todd (2005) and Machin et al
(2004). This approach relaxes the strong assumption of the cross-sectional matching ap-
proaches of selection based solely on observables and allows for temporally invariant differ-
ences in outcomes between pupils in specialist and non-specialist schools. The DID matching
can be seen as an extension of simple matching, because the bias is not required to vanish
for any covariates but just to be the same before and after treatment.














WijY0t′j ]wit′ . (3)
where t′ and t are time periods before and after the acquisition of specialist school status.
Specifically, Tt′ is formed by students in schools non-specialist in t
′ that will be specialist in
t, Ct′ is formed by students in schools non-specialist in t
′ that will remain non-specialist in
t. Tt includes students in schools specialist in t that where non-specialist in t
′, Ct includes
students in schools non-specialist in t which were also non specialist in t′.
The specialist schools policy may have had a disproportionate effect on test scores at age
16 (the GCSE) because these are ‘high stakes’ exams that influence the ranking of schools in
local and national league tables. Therefore, we also estimate a value added DID matching
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model where we compute the difference between the standardized tests taken at age 16 and
at age 11, and then estimate equation 3 except that Y is replaced by ∆Y = Yage16 − Yage11.
A further issue arises insofar as expenditure per pupil has risen for reasons other than
the specialist schools policy and we must control for this. Therefore, we estimate a post-
matching regression including real expenditure per pupil, measured in 2003 prices, of the
form:7
Yis = α + βSpecis + γp̂(xi) + ρSpecis(p̂(xi)− µp) + θExpis + εis (4)
where p̂(xi) = P (Specis = 1|xi) is the estimated propensity score, µp is the sample average
of p̂(xi) and Expis are the expenditure per pupil in school s. Since we only have data on
expenditure from 1999, we restrict our sample to schools that become specialist from 1999
to 2002, and schools that are non-specialist in the same period but which become specialist
between 2003 and 2005.
4 Findings
4.1 Estimation of the propensity score models
In the estimations of the propensity score models, the choice of the covariates to be included is
an issue (Heckman et al. 1997, Bryson et al. 2002). There is some discussion in the literature
which emphasises that the balancing condition is satisfied, hence reducing the influence of
confounding variables (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 1999, DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). Therefore,
in the estimation of the propensity score with most of our data sets we include only those
variables that satisfy both the balancing test and the common support condition. However,
given the extremely large sample size of the NPD, with more than 300,000 observations in
our analyses, it is very difficult to pass this test. In this case it is important to include in
the propensity score model all variables that are strong predictors of attendance at specialist
schools and outcomes. These variables include factors that affect a pupil’s choice of school,
and also those variables that affect a schools’ acquisition of specialist status. Table 3 reports
the estimates for a selection of the estimated PS models, including those that use the NPD.
A larger number of covariates are included in the propensity score model using the YCS
data, for instance, controls for family background (i.e. parental occupation) and whether
the pupil is from a single parent background. A very important variable to include is the
school performance lagged five years, which is likely to be an important influence on school
choice for pupils at age 11 and selection of a school into the specialist schools initiative.8
Most variables are statistically significant and we note a strong effect on the lagged school
performance on school choice (the marginal effect is also very strong, 0.993 with a s.e of
7In the post-matching analysis we adopt a control function approach using the propensity score
(Wooldridge, 2005 and Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983). We regress our dependent variable (test scores)
on the treatment dummy variable (Spec), the estimated propensity score and its deviation from the mean
interacted with Spec. The coefficient of the Spec dummy consistently estimates ATE. In our specific case,
we add in the post-matching regression the expenditure per pupil variable and its deviation from the mean
interacted with Spec. In this way we want to get the treatment effect corrected for the fact that the control
group changes over time.
8This variable measures the proportion of pupils in the school (lagged five years) who obtained five or
more A*-C grades in the GCSE examinations.
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0.173); estimates on the family background variables are also quite large and statistically
significant.
The analysis in the LSYPE is more complex, since the treatment group refers to pupils in
specialist schools disaggregated by the duration that the school has been in receipt of special-
ist school funding; the control group comprises pupils in non-specialist schools. Specifically,
we consider three possible treatments: schools that have been specialist for five or more
years, for four years and for two years. Many more covariates are included in these models
than in the previous models for the YCS. The estimates typically have the right sign and
most of them are statistically significant.
In the propensity score model estimated for the school level matching (not reported) we
include only pre-policy school characteristics, that is, variables measured before the start of
the specialist school programme in 1994. A large number of school and pupil characteristics
are included, such as school size, the pupil-teacher ratio, the proportion of pupils eligible for
free school meals, the ethnic composition of the school and school type. All of these variables
are highly statistically significant and they pass the balancing test.
To compute the DID matching estimator we estimate four propensity score models, corre-
sponding to the level and value added matching models for the year 2002-2003 and 2003-2004.
In Table 3 we only report the model constructed from the NPD 2002-2003, but the others
have similar results. We include a measure of prior attainment (KS2 test score), which cap-
tures the cumulative effect of the history of family, pupil and school inputs that determined
test scores up to age 11 (Todd and Wolpin, 2002). Its effect is highly statistically significant
with a marginal effect of 0.02 (s.e.=0.002). This suggests that more able primary school
pupils sort into, or are selected by, specialist schools. We also include dummies for ethnicity
and gender, both of which are statistically significant. A measure of family income, that
is, whether a pupil is eligible for free school meals, is also included. The marginal effect is
negative and highly significant and suggests that pupils from poorer backgrounds are less
likely to attend specialist schools. We also include a number of school level variables, that are
measured in the pre-policy period, including school type, pupil-teacher ratio, the proportion
of pupils eligible for free school meals and school size which may influence whether a school
is selected into the specialist schools initiative. All of these variables are highly statistically
significant.
In sum, the covariates in the propensity score models work in the expected direction and
confirm some of the claims made in the Introduction regarding the sorting of schools and
pupils into the specialist schools programme.
4.2 ‘Cross-sectional’ matching estimates
In this Section we investigate the potential impact of the specialist schools policy on test
scores assuming no hidden bias, that is, that there is no correlation between treatment
status and unobserved variables. However, we do need to assess the effect of estimation on
the reduction in bias on observables and the CIA. We therefore report the results with and
without the inclusion of the confounder variable, and assess matching quality by reporting
the standardized bias associated with each matching estimator (Caliendo et al, 2005).9 In
9This requires that for each covariate we compute the standardised bias (SB) in the unmatched and
matched sub-samples as the difference in sample means between treated and control observations, divided
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most empirical studies a bias reduction of 3% to 5% is seen as a success of the matching
procedure.
4.2.1 A ‘policy-on’ versus ‘policy-off’ analysis using the YCS
Table 4 shows that, prior to matching, pupils in a given school during a ‘policy-on’ period
obtain around 2.8 GCSE points more than their counterparts in the same school in the
‘policy-off’ period (Gcsescore). After matching we observe a reduction in the effect on
GCSE points score by between 15-37%, with the estimated impact falling to between 1.7-
2.0 points, depending on which estimator is used. Interestingly, there is no statistically
significant difference in the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more GCSEs graded A*-C
(Gcsebin). However, at the very top of the attainment distribution (Gcsebin10 ) a positive
and statistically significant effect is observed. In fact, the pre-match estimate of 0.09 falls
to between 0.07-0.08 implying that the specialist schools policy increased the probability of
obtaining 10+ GCSE grades A*-C by between 7-8 percentage points.
The inclusion of a confounder variable does not dramatically change our results. This is
also confirmed by the Rosembaum test (see Table 4, lower panel) in a situation of up to 50%
hidden bias. As an additional robustness check we estimate equation 4 which corresponds to
a post-matching regression that includes expenditure per pupils at school level. We notice
that the effect of the policy remains substantially unchanged compared to the matching
estimates. In particular, for Gcsescore the effect is 1.86, a values that lies between the
nearest neighbour and kernel estimates. The same happens for Gcsebin10, while the effect
for Gcsebin is still insignificant. Note that in this analysis we mitigate the bias arising from
school selection bias, this is because we remove unobserved school fixed effects and due to
the short time framework of the analysis it is also unlikely to be affected by pupil selection
bias.
4.2.2 The effect of the duration of specialist school status using the LSYPE
Insofar as specialist schools receive extra funding per pupil for 4 years after they have become
specialist, and given that subject-specific ‘reputation’ effects take time to develop, then one
would expect the positive effect on test scores that we observe to be larger the longer the
school has had specialist status. Table 5 shows that this is, in fact, what we observe. Compare
the results for schools that have been specialist for 4 and 5 or more years with those that
have been specialist for only 2 years, where the heterogeneity of the specialist schools policy
becomes apparent.
Prior to matching, pupils in schools that have been specialist for longest obtain 4 GCSE
points more than their counterparts in non-specialist schools. The equivalent figure for
schools that have been specialist for only 2 years is lower at 2.8 GCSE points. After matching,
these effects fall to 2.3 and 1.3 GCSE points, respectively, and the latter are statistically
insignificant. The duration of specialist status clearly matters, however, it is also worth
comparing the estimates for schools that have been specialist for 4 years with those that
by the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups. We then average over the SB of each
covariate in the two subsamples in order to obtain the absolute value of the SB before matching and after
matching.
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have been specialist for 5 or more years. Recall, that funding typically lasts for up to 4
years. What we observe is that both pre- and post-matching estimates for the schools that
have been specialist for 4 years are larger by between 0.5-1 GCSE point, implying that once
the funding begins to dry up, the effect on test scores begins to wane. Importantly, however,
it does not fall to zero.
In sum, this analysis suggests that the longer the time a school has been specialist, the
better the test scores of the pupils, however, this effect falls as funding declines. It is also
worth noting in passing that the estimated effects for schools that have been specialist for 4
or more years are consistent with those from the previous analysis using the YCS.
The standardized bias is substantially reduced, but the estimates are less robust to the
inclusion of a confounding variable. Moreover, the Rosembaum’s test in Table 5, lower
panel shows that our estimates are not sensitive to hidden bias up to a level of 25%.
4.3 Difference-in-differences estimates using the NPD data
4.3.1 School Matching and linear difference-in-differences in test scores
Table 6 reports two sets of estimates from three models, one for the comparison of the
2004 with the 2002 cohort, and the other for the comparison of the 2003 and 2002 cohorts.
In each case the dependent variable is the unstandardised GCSE score. In model 1 we
include only the policy effect and year dummies, and these estimates correspond to the ‘raw’
difference-in-differences reported in Panel A of Table 2. For instance, the average effect
of the specialist schools policy is 0.266 for the comparison of the 2004 and 2002 cohorts
(see the penultimate column). This suggests that pupils in specialist schools achieved an
improvement of approximately one quarter of a GCSE point more than their counterparts
in non-specialist schools. This estimate is retrieved in Table 6 (see model 1, column 1). To
reduce the effect of unobservable school differences, model 2 adds a large number of school
and pupil composition variables, along with a smaller number of pupil characteristics. In
model 3 we also add school fixed effects.
Model 1 of Table 6 shows the heterogeneity in the estimates of the specialist schools
policy effect; the estimates range from zero to 0.9 of a GCSE point for the 2004-2002 cohorts
and zero to 1.4 GCSE points for the 2003-2002 cohorts. Adding pupil and school covariates
(model 2) increases the magnitude of the average effect to around 0.3-0.4 of a GCSE point
and this does not change much when we add school fixed effects (model 3). The policy effects
for each year also tend to increase once covariates and school fixed effects are included. What
is interesting is that the largest effects are observed for schools that have been specialist for
longer - compare the estimates from model 3 for the years 1999-2000 with those of 2002. For
instance, for pupils in schools that became specialist in the period 1999-2000, GCSE scores
improve by between 0.8-1.2 points. These estimates are slightly lower than those obtained
in the cross-sectional analysis using the YCS and about half those obtained for the LSYPE.
Nevertheless, a positive and statistically significant effect of the policy is observed after the
funding has been switched off.
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4.3.2 Difference-in-differences matching in test score
In Table 7 we report the estimates of the DID matching estimator (equation 3) from two
models. In model 1 the dependent variable is Gcescore, and we compare the post-treatment
cohort in 2004 with the pre-treatment cohort in 2002, which is then repeated for the 2003
and 2002 cohorts. We also report the cross-sectional matching estimates corresponding to
the first and the second difference of the model together with the DID estimates. The
unmatched values are slightly lower than those reported in Panel B of Table 2 because we
are now considering only observations on the common support. Looking at the results for
2002-04, the unmatched effect of the policy for the second difference Tt − Ct is positive and
significant and higher than the estimate for the first difference Tt′ − Ct′ , this gives a DID
value of around 0.05 GCSE points. This can be interpreted as the increase in test scores
that a pupil in a non-specialist school in 2002 would have obtained in 2004 by attending a
specialist school, compared to a similar pupil who attended a non-specialist school in both
2002 and 2004. After matching, we notice that the estimates of the second and the first
difference drops substantially compared to the unmatched case, however the drop in the first
difference is much higher and consequently this gives a DID ATT effect that is positive and
much larger than the unmatched estimate at around 0.37 GCSE points. This implies that,
after controlling for unobservable time invariant characteristics, the policy still has a positive
effect on test scores. Similar findings are observed when we compare the 2002-2003 cohorts,
however the DID ATT is now statistically insignificant. This is probably because the schools
that are specialist have only been so for one year. Hence, the duration of specialist status
matters.
In model 2 we repeat the same analysis but replace the level of the test scores with a value-
added measure, that is, test score gains between KS4 and KS2. Since we use standardized
test scores, the effect is measured in standard deviation points. All estimates are highly
significant before matching, post matching the results are statistically insignificant. Again
we think that this is due to the fact that schools have only been specialist for one or two
years of the pupils secondary school education.
4.4 The relative importance of the funding and specialisation ef-
fects
So far we have considered the total impact of the specialist schools policy by simply looking
at the test score outcomes in all subjects for pupils in specialist schools compared to various
control groups. In this Section we construct a test to try to disentangle the funding and
specialisation effects of the specialist schools policy using the NPD.
We focus on test score differences solely for the subjects in which the schools specialised,
using the NPD. We restrict our analysis to schools that had become specialist in one of
the following subject areas - Languages, with and without English, and Technology, which
comprise the majority of pupils.10
To disentangle the specialisation effect from the funding effect we compare the estimates
from Panel A with those from Panel B in Table 8. Panel A compares the test score outcome
10We tried to include more subjects but we did not have enough observations to perform a matching
analysis.
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in say, Languages, of pupils in a specialist school which specialises in that particular subject
(the treatment group) with the test score outcome of pupils in Languages in specialist schools
that do not specialise in that subject (the control group). Since both schools are specialist
they receive the same funding and so the funding effect is constant. In contrast, Panel B
compares our treatment group with a different control group - pupil’s test score in Languages
in non-specialist schools. Since the latter do not receive extra funding, any difference in test
score outcomes in Panel B must arise from both the funding and specialisation effects. The
difference in the estimates from Panel A and Panel B gives the specialisation effect.
Table 8, Panels A and B show that after matching Gcsescore falls substantially, and
they are robust to a confounder variable. However, what is of most interest is the fact that
the estimates from Panel B are higher than those for Panel A and the magnitude of this
difference depends on the matching estimator. For instance, compare the nearest neighbour
estimates for Technology of 0.23 (Panel B) and 0.18 (Panel A) with the equivalent for the
kernel matching method, that is, 0.32 and 0.16, respectively. The difference between the
estimates in Panels A and B for the nearest neighbour method is roughly 0.05 for all subjects,
which implies that the specialisation effect constitutes around 22% of the total effect of the
specialist schools policy. For the kernel method the implied percentage contribution of the
specialisation effect varies from 38% for English to 50% for Technology. Thus, although the
actual magnitude of the impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores in the subjects
analysed is modest, when compared to the findings in earlier sections, the contribution of
the specialisation effect is quite large when measured in percentage terms.
A word of caution is necessary, however, insofar as the specialisation effect might be
picking up the fact that ‘good’ specialist schools, typically the early adopters, simply ap-
plied for specialist status in their strongest subject. If this view is correct then we should
observe that a specialist schools performance in tests in subjects other than that in which it
specialises is lower when compared to a non-specialist school. To assess whether this is the
case we examine the raw data and make pairwise comparisons between specialist schools in
specialisms m (English, Technology or Languages) versus non-specialist schools for subjects
n, where m 6= n.11 For schools specialising in English the raw data suggests superior per-
formance in all n subjects by around 0.3 of a GCSE point; for Language and Technology
schools the differential falls to 0.1-0.2 of a GCSE point. This evidence is encouraging insofar
as it suggests that our specialisation effect is real.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluated whether there is a causal association between the specialist schools
policy, which can be regarded as a structural change in UK education policy beginning in
1994, and the test score outcomes of secondary school pupils in England. Our approach has
been to use matching methods, which have become popular in the context of programme
evaluation, especially with respect to the effectiveness of training schemes and programmes
for the unemployed. To our knowledge there has been no previous attempt to apply such
11The n subjects refer to maths, science, history and business studies; we also examine languages, English
and technology but only where m 6= n.
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methods to an evaluation of the specialist schools policy. By adopting this approach we
explicitly confronted the twin problems of the choice of suitable control groups, to answer
the counterfactual question of what would have happened in the absence of treatment, and
the potential bias arising from a correlation between the treatment status and observed and
unobserved covariates.
We used several datasets in our analysis, the NPD, several versions of the YCS and the
LSYPE, which allow us to construct different control groups and hence test the robustness
of our estimates. Three measures of test score outcome, relating to particular points on
the test score distribution (Gcsebin and Gcsebin10 ) or a summary of the entire distribution
(Gcsescore), were considered. We estimated both individual cross-sectional matching and
difference-in-differences matching models, and also linear difference-in-differences models
combined with matching at school level. We investigated the effect of the specialist schools
policy on both tests scores and change in test scores between the ages of 11 and 16.
Our main findings are as follows. The estimates from the cross-sectional models were
generally consistent suggesting that the specialist schools policy has increased the GCSE
points score by approximately 2-3 GCSE points, and a more substantial effect has been
observed at the upper (Gcsebin) and high end (Gcsebin10 ) of the test score distribution.
These results imply that the policy has had a more beneficial effect on more able students.
Furthermore, the longer a school has been a specialist school the larger the impact on test
scores, however, we found some evidence that the impact begins to fall after 4 years once
the additional funding associated with the policy begins to decline. Importantly, the policy
effect did not fall to zero. These results were robust to tests that controlled for the presence
of unobservable confounding factors. The linear DID model evaluated the effect on test
scores gains of school becoming specialist while the pupils were still enrolled. The results
confirmed that the effect on GCSE scores is slightly higher for those schools that have been
specialist for longest, but the specialist schools policy has had a modest effect on GCSE test
scores, and no effect on KS3 tests.
In the DID matching models we estimated the effect of the policy on test score levels and
test score gains from a pre-treatment status to a post-treatment status. We have been able
to control for unobserved individual and school fixed effects and time-invariant unobserved
characteristics. We found a positive and highly statistically significant effect of the policy
on test scores for schools that have been specialist for two years. The effect is statistically
insignificant if schools have been specialist for only one year and when we use value-added
test scores. These results confirm that duration of specialization matters and that ‘older’
schools may attract better pupils.
Finally, the impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores could arise from a funding
effect, a specialisation effect or a peer effect. We attempted to disentangle these effects.
Our findings for GCSE points score suggested that between 21-50% of the total effect in
particular subjects arises from the specialisation effect. These findings were consistent with
our evidence on the duration of the specialist school policy effect.
In conclusion, having controlled for various types of selection bias, we argue that the
specialist schools policy has had a statistically significant causal effect on test score outcomes
and test score gain.
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A Appendix: Testing the validity of the CIA assump-
tion
The CIA is not directly testable, because the data are uninformative about the distribution
of Yi(0) for the treated and of Yi(1) for the control group. We therefore use two indirect
tests from the literature. One test, developed by Imbens (2004), proposes an indirect way
of assessing the CIA, based on the estimation of a ‘pseudo’ confounding factor that should,
if the CIA holds, have zero effect. We adopt the method proposed by Ichino et al. (2008).
This is based on the prediction of a confounding factor, A, by simulating its distribution for
each treated and control unit. Then, estimates of the average treatment effect of the treated
(ATT) are derived by including the confounding factor in the set of matching variables.
Different assumptions on the distribution of A imply different possible scenarios of deviation
from the CIA.
For simplicity, let A be a binary variable, its distribution is given by fixing the following
parameters
P (A = 1|T = i, Y = j) = pij i, j = 0, 1
Where Y is a binary test score outcome (e.g. ‘high ability’= 1 and ‘low ability’= 0) and
T is the pupil’s treatment status. In this way, we can define the probability of A = 1 in
each of the four groups identified by the treatment and the outcome.12 In our analysis, we
assume that the confounding variable follows the same distribution as that of the pupil test
scores prior to entry to secondary school (i.e. Key Stage 2 scores). Therefore A can be
thought as a measure of the ability of the pupil that secondary schools ‘observe’ in making
selection decisions. The effect of bias on the estimation of the policy varies depending on
the dataset used.13 The variable A is included in the set of variables used to estimate the
propensity score and the ATT is estimated using the nearest neighbour algorithm.14 The
ATT is re-estimated 500 times, and the values presented in our Tables are an average over
the distribution of A(See NN with confounder).
Given this set up, if the confounded estimates are still significant, but with the same sign
and (similar) in magnitude when compared to the ‘true’ estimates, we can be fairly confident
of the robustness of our results.
The second method we adopt has been proposed by Rosenbaum (1987) and involves only
one parameter, representing the association of T and A, and derives bounds for significance
levels and confidence intervals. Specifically, it computes the upper and lower bounds on
the Mantel and Haenszel (MH, 1959) test-statistic used to test the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect. In particular, eγ measures the degree of departure from a situation that
is free of hidden bias (eγ = 1) and we use eγ in the range [1,2]; γ represents the effect of
an unobserved variable on the probability of attendance at a specialist school.15 The test
12The simplifying assumption that the simulation of A does not depend on X does not change the inter-
pretation of the test. For a complete explanation of the test see Ichino et al. (2008).
13For example, for the NPD we obtain the following parameters: p11 = 0.76, p10 = 0.30, p01 = 0.73, p00 =
0.29; p11 can be interpreted as the proportion of ‘high ability’ pupils in specialist schools who get high test
scores. In contrast in the LSYPE we get p11 = 0.72, p10 = 0.28, p01 = 0.75, p00 = 0.33, where there is a
slightly higher probability of ‘high ability’ pupils obtaining high test scores attending non-specialist schools.
14We omit the results for different matching methods because they are very similar.
15Thus Pr(Di = 1|xi, ui) = F (βxi + γui) is the probability of attending a specialist school and F is the
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can be interpreted as the difference in the relative odds of attending a specialist school for
two pupils that appear similar in terms of observable covariates, x. If those most likely to
go to specialist schools are more able, then there is positive unobserved selection and the
estimated treatment effects overestimate the true treatment effect. In general, DiPrete and
Gangl (2004) stress that the results of this test are worst-case scenarios, insofar as they only
reveal how the hidden bias might alter inference.
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Table 1: Dependent variables
LSYPE YCS11-12
Duration specialist
5+years 4 years 2 years
Gcsescore mean
Non-specialist 45.805 44.303 45.805 43.124
N 1,455 1,873 1,455 2,796
Specialist 49.859 49.871 48.491 45.904



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Probit estimates from selected propensity score models
YCS NPD LSYPE
spec 5+ years spec 4 years spec 2 years
KS2 point score 0.021*** 0.014** 0.019*** 0.012*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
girl -0.035 -0.010** 0.084*** 0.196*** 0.090**
(0.035) (0.004) (0.024) (0.050) (0.044)
ethnic 0.064 0.106*** -0.039*** 0.040 0.109*
(0.056) (0.006) (0.007) (0.054) (0.049)
parents degree -0.030 0.222** 0.047
(0.073) (0.088) (0.081)
parents HE below degree 0.026 0.169* 0.115
(0.069) (0.087) (0.077)
parents A-level 0.006 0.177** 0.097
(0.066) (0.082) (0.073)
parents GCSE a-c 0.024 0.144** -0.007
(0.050) (0.065) (0.057)




parents employed -0.035 0.136** 0.026
(0.116) (0.063) (0.124)
parents unemployed 0.267*** -0.165 -0.143
(0.098) (0.117) (0.126)
parents on income support -0.135* -0.135 -0.063
(0.064) (0.085) (0.077)
parent missing 0.144*** 0.003 -0.110*
(0.046) (0.060) (0.054)
smokes cigarettes -0.009 0.042 -0.102
(0.065) (0.082) (0.076)
uses school sports facilities -0.019* -0.025 -0.050**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.019)
uses pc at home 0.134** 0.203** 0.023
(0.058) (0.078) (0.065)
School test score(t−5) 2.499***
(0.435)
eligibility free school meals -0.016***
(0.008)
cons -0.930*** -0.010 -0.110 -1.211*** -0.220
(0.127) (0.041) (0.200) (0.218) (0.226)
N 5,122 264,286 3,434 3,434
log-likelihood -3508.106 -176314.59 -2943.747 -2341.202 -2341.2028
Chi-square 62.07 13737.03 89.93 78.01 78.01
In the NPD model we also include a number of school level variable that are measured in the pre-policy period including
school type, pupil-teacher ratio, the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals and school size. All of this variables
are highly statistically significant.
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Table 4: Policy-off policy-on analysis using the YCS
Gcsescore Gcsebin Gcsebin10 St.Bias
unmatched 2.761*** 0.012 0.085*** 5.201
(0.443) (0.013) (0.009) (4.202)
NN(1) 1.732*** -0.013 0.072*** 1.601
(0.593) (0.018) (0.013) (1.438)
NN(1) with counfounder 1.385** -0.030 0.063***
(0.691) (0.021) (0.015)
Kernel(0.1) 1.988*** -0.012 0.078*** 0.937





eγ = 1 eγ = 1.25 eγ = 1.50 eγ = 1.75 eγ = 2
Gcsescore 2.65*** 1.0-4.3*** -0.40-5.6 -1.55-6.7 -2.55-7.65
Gcsebin10 4.0*** 2.60-5.45*** 1.47-6.66* 0.53-7.72 0.11-8.66
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Balancing Property and Common Support satisfied.Analytical s.e. for NN, Bootstrap (500 repetitions) for Kernel




where: xnon−sp = mean of the non-specialist schools group
xspec = mean of the specialist school group, s
2
non−sp = variance of the non-specialist schools group
s2spec = variance of the specialist school group.
Significance of MH statistic bound indicates treatment effect is not sensitive to selection bias.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Difference-in-differences using pupil-level matching
Model 1: Gcsescore Model 2: KS4-KS2
(2002-04) (2002-03) (2002-04) (2002-03)
Tt′ − Ct′
unmatched 2.578*** 3.280*** 0.037*** 0.056***
(0.088) (0.102) (0.003) (0.004)
ATT 1.178*** 1.279*** 0.021 0.046
(0.139) (0.162) (0.028) (0.035)
Tt − Ct
unmatched 2.629*** 3.422*** 0.039*** 0.080***
(0.091) (0.103) (0.003) (0.004)
ATT 1.549*** 1.452*** 0.055* 0.057
(0.143) (0.164) (0.030) (0.046)
DID 0.050*** 0.141*** 0.001*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
DID ATT 0.370** 0.172 0.033 0.010
(0.141) (0.163) (0.029) (0.041)
Notes: analytical s.e. in parenthesis. Model 1: control for gender,
prior attainment at age 11, ethnicity, pre-policy school,
characteristics. Model 2 excludes prior attainment and the
coefficients are in standard deviation points.
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Table 8: The relative importance of funding and school specialisation on GCSE score
English Technology Languages
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Panel A: pupils in schools specialising in subject m
vs pupils in schools specialising in subject n
unmatched 0.383*** 0.237*** 0.180***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045 )
NN 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.144***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.029)
NN with confounder 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.083**
(0.042) (0.051) (0.037)
Kernel(0.1) 0.180*** 0.161*** 0.101**
(0.0453) (0.058) (0.042)
Panel B: pupils in schools specialising in subject m
vs pupils non-specialist schools taking subject m
unmatched 0.432*** 0.460*** 0.334***
(0.039) (0.033) (0.049)
NN 0.226*** 0.231*** 0.180***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
NN with confounder 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.101**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.045)
Kernel(0.1) 0.288*** 0.318*** 0.146
(0.050) (0.051) (0.042)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Balancing Property and Common Support satisfied
Analytical s.e. for NN, Bootstrap (500) for Kernel
Confounder generated using KS2 test score distribution.
Sample sizes: English Literature Panel A 48,804 Panel B 166,321;
Technology Panel A 89,062 Panel B 195,219;
Foreign Languages Panel A 55,762 Panel B 155,138.
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